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JURISDICTION 
The order appealed from was entered November 5, 1999. The order was a final 
judgment Boggs v. Boggs, 824 P.2d 478, 480 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Mrs. Barton filed her 
notice of appeal on December 3, 1999. The notice was timely. Utah R. App. P. 4(a). The 
contempt claim arises out of a domestic relations action, and this Court therefore has original 
appellate jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Where a divorce decree provided that the Utah would retain jurisdiction only 
until a Special Master was established in California, and where the Special Master had been 
established, did the Utah court err in holding that it still had jurisdiction? This issue presents 
a question of the effect of a prior judicial decision and is reviewed for correctness. Billings 
v. Union Bankers Insurance Co., 918 P.2d 461, 464 (Utah 1996). This was raised in Mrs. 
Barton's Affidavit in Response to Respondent's Order to Show Cause re Contempt. (Record 
406-403.) 
2- Where the children and both parents had moved from the state of Utah, did the 
decree court retain jurisdiction to modify visitation rights as a sanction for perceived 
contempt? This is a question of law reviewed for correctness, with no deference to the ruling 
of the trial court. Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 646-647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). This was 
raised in Mrs. Barton's Affidavit in Response to Respondent's Order to Show Cause re 
Contempt. (Record 406-403.) 
1 
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3 .t Where a party presented evidence that she lacked the money to pay a contempt 
judgment and there was no contrary evidence, did the court abuse its discretion in finding 
the party in continued contempt for failing to pay the judgment? Orders relating to contempt 
of court are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Dansie v. Dansie. 1999 Utah App. 92, ]f 6,977 
P.2d 539, 540. Mrs. Barton's lack of income was raised by testimony and argument. 
(Transcript Oct. 18 pp. 22-23, 127-128) 
3. Are the contempt citations supported by adequate findings, where there was 
no finding that petitioner had the ability to comply with the court orders, and where the court 
failed to address petitioner's claim that an independent therapist strongly counseled against 
allowing respondent to exercise unsupervised visitation with the minor children? This Court 
reviews de novo the question of whether the findings are adequate. Butler. Crockett and 
Walsh Development Corp. v. Pinecrest Pipeline Operating Co., 909 P.2d 225, 232 (Utah 
1995).
 v _ 
4, In a proceeding to determine the penalty for contempt, is evidence of legal and 
other advice given to the party relevant, and is the party's testimony concerning that advice 
admissible over a hearsay objection? Matters relating to the admission of evidence are 
reviewed for abuse of discretion. Trolley Square Associates v. Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 66 
(Utah Ct. App. 1994). This was raised by offering the testimony at trial and preferring the 
evidence. (Transcript Oct. 18 pp. 17, 20-21.) 
2 
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DETERMINATIVE STATUTES, RULES OR CASES 
A copy of the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A, is 
attached in the Addendum. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. This was a contempt proceeding arising in the context of 
a divorce case. 
B. Course of Proceedings And Disposition Below. 
The parties were divorced by a decree entered April 9, 1997. (Record 59-58.) An 
Addendum to Decree of Divorce was entered December 22, 1998. (Record 324-303.) The 
Addendum to Decree of Divorce granted specific rights of visitation to Mr. Barton. The 
Addendum appointed a Special Master in California to monitor visitation, and further 
provided that jurisdiction would then be transferred to California. 
John Barton asserted that Rhonda Barton had interfered with his visitation rights, and 
on July 19, 1999, he obtained an Order to Show Cause in Re Contempt which scheduled a 
hearing for August 11, 1999. Rhonda Barton was served with the order on Aug. 3, 1999. 
(Transcript Aug. 11, page 4.) Mrs. Barton did not physically appear at the hearing, but filed 
an affidavit (Record 406-386) responding to the claims in the order to show cause, asserting 
that Mr. Barton was emotionally abusive to the children (Record 395-394 % 37,393 ^ 41,390 
If 53), and asserting that the Court should defer jurisdiction to a proceeding which Mrs. 
Barton had commenced in California. Judge Lynn Davis found Mrs. Barton in contempt for 
3 
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failing to personally appear and for failing to allow visitation. (Transcript Aug. 11, page 31.) 
Judge Davis also ordered that Mrs. Barton reimburse Mr. Barton $1397.00 for travel 
expenses and attorney fees relating to the hearing. Judge Davis reserved the issue of penalty 
for contempt, to be determined at a review hearing after 60 days. (Record 413.) 
On September 13, 1999, Mrs. Barton filed a motion to transfer jurisdiction to 
California. (Record 429-428.) She also filed an Ex Parte Motion for Order Staying 
Unsupervised Visitation, supported by a letter from the Special Master stating that the 
children were fearful of Mr. Barton and that it would not be in their best interests to have 
unsupervised visitation with him. (Record 439-434.) Judge Lynn Davis reviewed the Ex 
Parte Motion for Order Staying Unsupervised Visitation, but declined to enter any order 
because a hearing on the contempt issues was scheduled to be heard before Judge Harding. 
(Record 440, 450-448.) 
On September 28,1999, Judge Harding conferred with the California court and trans-
ferred to California jurisdiction over all matters except the pending contempt hearing. 
(Record447.) 
A hearing on the contempt issues was held October 18, 1999. Judge Harding found 
Mrs. Barton to be in continued contempt of court, ordered her incarcerated immediately to 
serve two days in jail, and imposed attorney fees and expenses of $3,631.88. Judge Harding 
refused to consider Mrs. Barton's oral motion for a stay of execution (Transcript October 18 
p. 148), so the jail time has been served. The monetary judgments remain outstanding. 
4 
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C. Statement of Facts. 
The parties have three children. Joshua was age 12 at the time of the contempt 
hearing, Brooke, age 9, and Jacob, age 7. (Transcript October 18 page 16.) Both parties 
resided in Thousand Oaks, California. (Transcript October 18 page 16; Record 382 f 5, 
Record 366, Record 404-405 f 2.) Mrs. Barton and the children moved to California in 
August 1997. (Record 406 f 2.) Mr. Barton moved to California in early 1998. (Record 
406-405 f 2, 382 f 5.) 
In a bifurcated proceeding, the parties were divorced by decree entered April 9, 
1997. (Record 59-58.) The remaining issues were addressed in a stipulated Addendum 
to Decree of Divorce entered December 22, 1998. (Record 324-303.) At that time the 
parties still had unresolved disputes regarding custody and visitation issues. (Record 382 
f 4.) Mrs. Barton contended that Mr. Barton had abused her and the children. (Record 
396.) The Addendum provided for appointment of a Special Master in California to 
resolve the visitation disputes: 
The parties are in agreement that Patrick C. Barker, 
Ph.D., 260 Maple Court, Suite 129, Ventura, California, 
93003-3512, telephone number 805-654-1018, fax number 
805-654-1098, shall be appointed as the Special Master 
between the parties. In the event that Dr. Barker is unable, or 
unwilling, to act as the Special Master between the parties, 
then Dr. James B. Cole, Ph.D., 993 West Seventh Street, 
Oxnard, California, 93030, telephone number 805-483-9565, 
fax number 805-486-5483, shall be appointed as the Special 
Master between the parties. 
5 
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(Record 315 f 4.) 
At the time of the Addendum, the parties were already living in California, so the 
Addendum provided for a transfer of jurisdiction: 
The Fourth District Court of Utah, State of Utah, shall 
maintain jurisdiction of this case until a Special 
Master/Interventionist in California is established and agreed 
upon between the parties. The Special Master will act as a 
child advocate and an arbitrator on behalf of the children and 
will be able to work with each parent to improve the parties1 
post divorce relationship. 
(Record 323-322 f 3.A.vi.) 
Consistent with the Addendum, Patrick C. Barker commenced to act as Special 
Master for the parties. Mrs. Barton met with him in March 1999. (Transcript October 
18 p. 18.) Dr. Barker then withdrew (Record 354), and, as provided in the Addendum, 
Dr. James P. Cole then served as Special Master. Mrs. Barton met with Dr. Cole in June 
1999. (Transcript Oct. 18, p. 19.) At that time, she discussed with him the fact that she 
was a school teacher and did not get paid during the summer months, and asked to not 
meet with him until September when she would receive her first paycheck for the new 
school year. Dr. Cole agreed to that delay. (Id.) 
On June 11, 1999, Mr. Barton sent Mrs. Barton a letter requesting summer 
visitation from August 5, 1999, through September 9, 1999, a period which included the 
children's first week of school. (Record 366-365, 398 f 27.) Mrs. Barton responded by 
6 
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agreeing to the first two weeks of the summer visitation, but objecting to the balance 
because it would prevent her from exercising the visitation and holidays awarded to her. 
(Record 398 f 26. 397 f 29.) Mr. Barton contacted the Special Master, but he declined 
to intervene apparently because Mrs. Barton had asked to delay meeting with him until 
September. (Record 377-376 1 21.) 
On July 19, 1999, John Barton obtained in Utah an Order to Show Cause In Re 
Contempt, which claimed that Mrs. Barton had not complied with the provisions of the 
Addendum to Decree of Divorce relating to the Special Master. (Record 409-408.) The 
Order to Show Cause scheduled a hearing in Heber City for August 11,1999, and was served 
on Mrs. Barton in California on August 3, six business days before the hearing. (Record 
407.) 
Mrs. Barton obtained counsel in California and commenced an action in California 
to determine the visitation issues there. The California counsel also assisted Mrs. Barton in 
preparing an affidavit which she filed in the Utah action. (Transcript Oct. 18 p. 16.) Mrs. 
Barton understood, based on the Addendum to Decree of Divorce and the affidavit she had 
prepared, that the case would be transferred to California. Based on that understanding, she 
did not personally appear at the Utah hearing. (Transcript Oct. 18, p. 18.) 
The hearing on August 11, 1999, was held before Judge Lynn Davis. Judge Davis 
expressed concern that this was really a matter which should be addressed by the California 
courts. (Transcript Aug. 11 pp. 6-8.) Judge Davis nonetheless undertook to exercise 
7 
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jurisdiction and found Mrs. Barton in contempt for failing to personally appear in Utah and 
for failing to allow visitation. Judge Davis awarded judgment against Mrs. Barton for travel 
expenses and attorney fees and awarded make-up visitation. (Record 415-412.) The make-
up visitation was to be unsupervised, contrary to the recommendation of the Special Master 
in California. 
A hearing on contempt sanctions was scheduled for October 18,1999. (Record 416, 
447.) At the time of the contempt hearing, Mrs. Barton was employed as a schoolteacher in 
California. (Transcript October 18 page 19.) She did not get paid during the summer months. 
(Id. pp. 19, 27.) Even when she was receiving her paycheck, her income was not sufficient 
to meet expenses. Her monthly take-home pay was $2,100 per month, plus she received 
$1,075 per month for child support. Her rent was $1,550, plus she had a car payment of 
$264, expenses for utilities, food, clothing, gasoline, etc.. She testified that she went in the 
hole every month. (Transcript October 18 page 23.) Mr. Barton did not present any evidence 
concerning the ability of Mrs. Barton to pay the judgment against her. 
At the hearing on October 18, 1999, Judge Harding found that Mrs. Barton had 
"continued in her ongoing willful and intentional disregard of the order of the court of 
August 12, 1999 especially as it relates to the issue of ongoing and makeup visitation." 
Judge Harding sentenced Mrs. Barton to two days in jail, to commence immediately, and 
ordered that all other issues of make-up visitation and other sanctions would be determined 
8 
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by the California court. (Record 480-479.) Mrs. Barton was immediately incarcerated and 
has served the two days jail time. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The parties were divorced in Utah, but then moved to California. The decree provided 
for appointment of a Special Master in California and stated that jurisdiction would transfer 
to Utah when the Special Master became "established." The Special Master had met with 
the parties regarding visitation issues, although there were ongoing disputes concerning the 
parties' relationship with the Special Master. The trial court should have found that the 
Special Master had been "established," and declined to exercise jurisdiction. 
The federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act also divested the trial court of 
jurisdiction. Under the PKPA, jurisdiction continues only so long as a party remains a 
resident of the decree state. Both parties and the children had moved to California, so the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction to proceed. 
Even if the court had jurisdiction, its rulings were in error. The court failed to make 
any finding concerning the ability of Mrs. Barton to pay the contempt judgment against her. 
The only evidence on the issue showed that she was a school teacher with no salary during 
the summer, and did not have the ability to pay the judgment. 
The trial court also erred by excluding Mrs. Barton's evidence to explain why she took 
the actions she did. The court excluded as hearsay evidence of advice Mrs. Barton received 
from her attorneys and from the Special Master. That evidence was not offered for the truth 
9 
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of the advice, however, but only to show that Mrs. Barton received the advice. That Mrs. 
Barton was acting on the advice of officers of the court was relevant to whether she was in 
contempt and relevant to the level of sanctions to be imposed. It was not hearsay and should 
have been admitted. 
i„ ARGUMENT 
POINTI : 
THE TRIAL COURT LACKED JURISDICTION. 
A. The Decree Required that Utah Defer to California's Jurisdiction. 
The Addendum to Decree of Divorce contained a clear provision that jurisdiction 
would be transferred to California as soon as a special Master was "established" there. The 
evidence showed the special Master had been appointed and was functioning. The trial court 
erred in failing to transfer jurisdiction to California. 
The Addendum stated: 
The Fourth District Court of Utah, State of Utah shall 
maintain jurisdiction of this case until a Special Master 
/Interventionist in California is established and agreed 
upon between the parties. The Special Master will act as 
a child advocate and an arbitrator on behalf of the 
children and will be able to work with each parent to 
improve the parties1 post divorce relationship. 
(Addendum to Decree of Divorce, U 3.A.iv at Record 323-324.) 
Mrs. Barton's affidavit asserted that a special Master had been established in 
California, and that both parties had participated with the special Master. Based on this 
10 
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claim of lack of jurisdiction, the trial court should have first determined whether it had 
jurisdiction before proceeding to hear the other issues. Even though Mrs. Barton did not 
personally appear at the hearing, a court always has an obligation to affirmatively inquire 
into its own jurisdiction. "A court's initial inquiry should always be to determine whether 
it has jurisdiction to determine a controversy." Otteson v. State, 945 P.2d 170, 171 (Utah 
App. 1997) (citation omitted). 
B. The PKPA Precluded Utah from Exercising Jurisdiction. 
In this case, the jurisdiction prerequisites under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45c-3 were no 
longer satisfied. Because the child and both contestants had moved away from Utah, Utah 
no longer had jurisdiction. Liska v. Liska, 902 P.2d 644, 647 (Utah Ct. App. 1995) ("Only 
when the child and all parties have moved away is deference to another state's continuing 
jurisdiction no longer required.") 
Although Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3) purports to grant a trial court "continuing 
jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or new orders for the custody of the children," this 
provision is superseded by the federal Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 
U.S.C. 1738A. Section 1738A(d) of the PKPA states: 
The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child 
custody or visitation determination consistently with the 
provisions of this section continues as long as the requirement 
of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such 
State remains the residence of the child or of any contestant 
II 
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This federal statute preempts the Utah provision. "Where the PKPA and the state's 
version of the UCCJA conflict, the PKPA preempts state law." Crump v. Crump, 821 P.2d 
1172, 1174 (Utah App. 1991), quoting State ex rel. D.S.K., 792 P.2d 118, 128 (Utah 
App.1990). "Unlike the UCCJA, the PKPA "anchors exclusive continuing jurisdiction to 
modify a previous custody decree in the original home state as long as the child or one of the 
contestants remains in that state." Crump, 821 P.2d at 1174-75 (citation omitted). 
Cases from other jurisdictions confirm that Utah lost jurisdiction when Mr. Barton 
moved to California. Maxie v. Fernandez, 649 F. Supp. 627 (E.D. Vir. 1986), addressed the 
question of whether the decree jurisdiction, the District of Columbia, retained jurisdiction. 
The mother and child had moved to Virginia. The father had physically moved to New 
York, although he claimed to retain a residence in the District of Columbia. The court found 
the father had moved, and concluded that the District of Columbia no longer had jurisdiction 
even though the District's own statutes provided for continuing jurisdiction. 649 F. Supp. 
at 630. Dahlen v. Dahlen, 393 N.W.2d 765 (N.D. 1986), similarly involved a situation 
where the state's statute provided for continuing jurisdiction, but the court held it had lost 
jurisdiction because all parties had moved from the state. 
In In re marriage of Pedowitz, 225 Cal. Rptr. 186 (5th Dist. 1986), the mother and 
child had moved permanently to Florida, but the father claimed to still reside in the decree 
state of California. The evidence showed that the father had lived in Florida for nearly a 
year, but had moved back to California. The California court held there were insufficient 
12 
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facts to show whether the father had remained a resident of California, and remanded the 
case for additional evidence. 
Here the evidence showed that all parties were residing in California. Utah had lost 
jurisdiction, both under the PKPA and under the clear terms of the decree itself. The trial 
court erred in exercising jurisdiction. 
C. The Trial Court Should Have Deferred to California's Jurisdiction. 
Even if Utah had technically retained jurisdiction, it should have concluded that 
jurisdiction should be in California. Both parties and children were in California. The 
children were born in Thousand Oaks, California, and all of their grandparents resided in 
California. (Record 404-405.) The decree itself provided that jurisdiction should shift to 
California. Under these circumstances, it would have been an abuse of discretion to fail to 
transfer jurisdiction to California. Liska v. Liska. 902 P.2d 644, 649-650 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
D. The Ruling on Jurisdiction Was Not Supported by Adequate Findings. 
If the trial court had inquired concerning jurisdiction and determined to retain jurisdic-
tion, one would have expected the court to make appropriate findings of fact and conclusions 
of law to support that decision. Particularly, one would have expected findings on the 
critical issues of the parties' residence and whether a Special Master had been "established" 
in California. Where the testimony of the parties was in conflict on these issues, the trial 
court was required to make express findings. 
13 
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E, Summary. r 
Mrs. Barton anticipates that Mr. Barton may assert that Utah retained jurisdiction over 
contempt issues. The decree, however, provided otherwise. In addition, it appears that 
Judge Harding imposed a harsh penalty in response to the perceived failure to comply with 
the make-up visitation ordered by Judge Davis, even though Judge Davis lacked jurisdiction 
to modify visitation.1 
The conclusion that jurisdiction should have been transferred to California was 
confirmed when the trial court actually transferred jurisdiction to California. This transfer 
left an anomalous state of affairs. Mrs. Barton was held in contempt for, in essence, trying 
to following the Addendum's requirement that visitation be determined by the Special Master 
and the California courts. The Utah court ultimately agreed with her. 
The end result is that Mrs. Barton served two days in jail and has a judgment against 
her for nearly $5000 for asserting that jurisdiction was in California, the same position 
ultimately adopted by the Utah court. This is clearly unfair. This court should hold that the 
trial court erred in addressing contempt issues without having first determined whether the 
court had or should exercise jurisdiction over the visitation issues. This court should further 
hold that the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the visitation issues. 
!It is interesting that Judge Harding held that he lacked jurisdiction to award makeup 
visitation as a sanction. (Transcript Oct. 18 p. 143.) 
14 
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POINT II 
MRS. BARTON WAS PREJUDICED 
BY THE TRIAL COURT'S EXCLUSION 
OF EVIDENCE JUSTIFYING HER ACTIONS. 
At the hearing on October 18, 1999, Mrs. Barton attempted to explain why she had 
not appeared at the hearing on August 11, and to further explained why she had not made 
children available for visitation with Mr. Barton. (Transcript Oct. 18 page 17.) Mr. Barton 
objected to testimony on the ground that was hearsay. The trial court sustained the 
objection. 
Hearsay is limited to statements "offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter 
asserted." Utah R. Evid. 801(c). When a statement is offered merely to prove that it was 
made, without regard to whether it is true, such testimony is not prohibited by the hearsay 
rule. State v. Sorensen. 617 P.2d 333 (Utah 1980). 
Although Judge Davis had already determined that Mrs. Barton was in contempt, the 
justifications for that contempt were still relevant in determining an appropriate sanction. 
That Mrs. Barton acted on advice of counsel or the advice of the Special Master is evidence 
was should have been received in justification of her actions. Mellor v. Cook 597 P.2d 882 
(Utah 1979); In re Thomas. 56 Utah 315, 109 P. 952 (1920). 
15 
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POINT III 
THE CONTEMPT FINDING WAS IMPROPER BECAUSE 
MRS. BARTON DID NOT HAVE THE ABILITY TO PAY 
THE REIMBURSEMENT ASSESSED AGAINST HER. 
In Thomas v.Thomas. 569 P.2d 1119 (1977), the Utah Supreme Court explained that 
a party cannot be held in contempt for failing to do something not within the party's power 
to perform. Neither Judge Davis nor Judge Harding made any finding concerning Mrs. 
Barton's ability to pay the reimbursement amounts assessed against her. Findings are 
required on this issue where there is a conflict. Coleman v. Coleman. 664 P.2d 1155, 1157 
(Utah 1983). 
Mrs. Barton testified, without contradiction, that she was employed as a school 
teacher on a ten month contract. During the summer months, she received no salary. Even 
when she received her salary, her expenses exceed her income. 
Judge Harding found Mrs. Barton in continued contempt for failing to pay amounts 
assessed by Judge Davis, yet there was no evidence that Mrs. Barton could have paid those 
amounts. Mr. Barton was already critical of her for failing to pay the charges of the Special 
Master. The court placed Mrs. Barton in an impossible situation. If she failed to pay Mr. 
Barton, she would be in continued contempt. If she failed to pay the Special Master, she 
would be found in contempt for failing to cooperate with the Special Master. 
At the very least, findings on the issue of ability to pay should have been made. 
Without those findings, it is impossible for this Court to determine whether there was 
16 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that two true and correct copies of the foregoing were mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this 24th day of April, 2000. 
Dana D. Burrows, Esq. 
1149 West Center Street 
Orem,UT 84057 
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APPENDIX "A" 
Addendum to Decree of Divorce, entered Dec. 22, 1998 
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DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 
Attorney for Respondent 
1149 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON, 
BARTON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON, 
Respondent. 
ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE 
Civil No. 954400090 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court by way of Petitioner's Complaint for 
Divorce and the parties having entered into a stipulation, which stipulation is approved by the court 
and the court being fully advised in the premises, and having entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now makes the ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE AS FOLLOWS: 
ADDENDUM TO DECREE OF DIVORCE 
1. The parties were previously divorced on April 9, 1997 after the court entered an order 
granting bifurcation allowing the Respondent to proceed with the divorce with all remaining issues 
reserved for trial. 
2. The parties have entered into a stipulated agreement incorporating: 
A. the terms and conditions of Dr. Jay Jensen's custody evaluation and 
addendum dated August 13, 1997 and October 18, 1997, respectively, and 
Z^:^^^ I 
,5 
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B. the involvement of a Special Master, 
C. certain Utah statutory provisions. 
3. Both parties shall be awarded the joint legal custody of the parties' three minor 
children, to wit: Joshua Johns Barton, bom September 29, 1987; Brooke Marie Barton, bom July 
25, 1990; and Jacob Pack Barton, bom July 8, 1992, with the Petitioner being awarded the actual 
physical custody and the Petitioner residence, in California, designated as the primary residence of 
the children, subject to the conditions and visitation as follows: 
A, At the present time the parties should not be obligated to make joint decisions 
on behalf of the children because of the conflict this creates. The resolution of the decision 
making and when and if joint decisions should be made in the future is assigned to the 
Special Master. The court finds that the children will benefit from having an enduring 
relationship with both of their parents and that both parents participate as parents. 
i. The parties are directed to prioritize the goal of promoting each other 
as vitally important in the children's development. 
ii. Both parents shall take the necessary steps towards establishing a new 
divorced relationship where the parents will eventually be able to communicate with 
each other effectively concerning the children. 
iii. Both parents should take the necessary steps to remove the conflict 
from their relationship so that the children's bonds with each parent will be less 
challenged. 
iv. The Fourth District Court of Utah, State of Utah, shall maintain 
jurisdiction of this case until a Special Master/Interventionist in California is 
established and agreed upon between the parties. The Special Master will act as a 
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child advocate and an arbitrator on behalf of the children and will be able to work 
with each parent to improve the parties' post divorce relationship. 
v# The children should maintain their residence with their mother in the 
state of California. Consideration should be given to maintaining an area in which 
to live so that the children's relationship with their father is not compromised by 
frequent moves by the mother. 
vi. Mr. Barton should maintain child oriented visitation with his children. 
He should sustain frequent contact with them, but do so respecting the children's 
developing interests. For instance, on visitation weekends where a child has a 
scheduled soccer game he should facilitate the child's and his own attendance to the 
game. In this regard, Petitioner should take care not to schedule activities which 
compete with the children's time with their father. 
vii. Pursuant to (30-3-33) Of Utah statute the following is agreed: 
;i a. Special consideration shall be given by each parent to make 
the child available to attend family functions including funerals, weddings, 
family reunions, religious holidays, important ceremonies and other 
significant events in the life of the child or in the life of either parent which 
... may inadvertently conflict with the visitation schedule. 
b. The custodial parent shall have the child ready for visitation 
at the time he is to be picked up and shall be present at the custodial home or 
shall make reasonable alternate arrangements to receive the child at the time 
he is returned. 
c The court (including the Special Master) may make alterations 
3 
r 
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in the visitation schedule of both parents and may increase the visitation 
allowed to the noncustodial parent but shall not diminish the standardized 
visitation provided in Section 30-3-35 nor the recommendations of Dr. Jay 
Jensen's custody evaluation. 
d. The court (including the Special Master) may make alterations 
in the visitation schedule to reasonably accommodate the distance between 
the parties and the expense of exercising visitation. 
e. Neither visitation nor child support is to be withheld due to 
either parent's failure to comply with a court-ordered visitation schedule. 
f. The custodial parent shall notify the noncustodial parent 
within 24 hours of receiving notice of all significant school, social, sports and 
community functions in which the child is participating or being honored, and 
the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to attend and participate fully. 
g. The noncustodial parent shall have access directly to all 
school reports including preschool and daycare reports and medical records 
and shall be notified immediately by the custodial parent in the event of a 
medical emergency. 
h. Each parent shall provide the other with his current address 
and telephone number within 24 hours of any change. 
L Each parent shall permit and encourage liberal and unhindered 
telephone contact during reasonable hours and uncensored mail privileges 
with the child. 
j . Parental care shall be presumed to be better care for the child 
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than surrogate care and the court (including the Special Master) shall 
encourage the parties to cooperate in allowing the noncustodial parent, if 
willing and able, to provide child care. 
k. The custodial parent shall provide all surrogate care providers 
with the name, current address and telephone number of the non-custodial 
parent and shall provide the noncustodial parent with the name, current 
address and telephone number of all surrogate care providers unless the court 
(including the Special Master) for good cause orders otherwise. 
1. Each parent shall be entitled to an equal division of major 
religious holidays celebrated by the parents, and the parent who celebrates a 
religious holiday that the other parent does not celebrate shall have the right 
to be together with the child on the religious holiday. 
B. Unless, and until, modified by the Special Master, Mr. Barton should 
maintain Utah Statutory Visitation with the children expanded during the alternating 
weekends in lieu of any midweek visit to commence on Thursday at the conclusion of school 
(or at the same time when school is not in session) with the pick-up to occur at the school, 
and/or preschool, and run through Monday morning when school recommences with the 
drop-off to occur at the school and/or preschool. When school is not in session, the same 
visitation is to be maintained with pick-up and drop-off to occur at another arranged location. 
The Petitioner will notify the Respondent at least fifteen (15) days in advance of any change 
in school, or preschool location. 
i. Alternating weekends, as defined above, beginning on the first 
weekend after the entry of the decree and continuing each year; 
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ii. Holidays take precedence over the weekend visitation, and changes 
shall not be made to the regular rotation of the alternating weekend visitation 
schedule; ;
 r 
iii. If a holiday falls on a regularly scheduled school day, the noncustodial 
parent shall be responsible for the child's attendance at school for that school day; 
iv. If a holiday falls on a weekend or on a Friday or Monday and the total 
holiday period extends beyond that time so that the child is free from school and the 
parent is free from work, the noncustodial parent shall be entitled to this lengthier 
holiday period; -
v. In years ending in an odd number, the noncustodial parent is entitled 
to the following holidays: T ii «.• 
a. Child's birthday on the day before or after the actual birthdate 
beginning at 3:00 p.m. until 9:00 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial 
parent, he may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
b. Human Rights Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
c. Easter holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Sunday 
at 7:00 p.m. unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
d. Memorial Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday 
at 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to 
which the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
c. July 24th beginning 6:00 p.m. on the day before the holiday 
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until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
ft Veteran's Day holiday beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before 
the holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; and 
g. The first portion of the Christmas school vacation (which term 
means the time period beginning when the child gets out of school for the 
Christmas school break until the time the child returns to school after the 
school break, except for Christmas Eve, Christmas Day, and the New Year's 
Day), plus Christmas Eve and Christmas Day until 1:00 p.m., so long as the 
entire holiday is equally divided; 
vi. In years ending in an even number, the noncustodial parent is entitled 
to the following holidays: >-.-
a. Child's birthday on actual birthdate beginning at 3:00 p.m. 
until 9:00 p.m.; at the discretion of the noncustodial parent, he may take other 
siblings along for the birthday; 
b. New Year's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
€» President's Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
d. July 4th beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the holiday 
until 11:00 p.m. on the holiday; : 
e. Labor Day Beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Friday until Monday at 
T 7:00 p.m., unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which 
the noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
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f. Fall school break, if applicable, commonly known as U.E.A. 
weekend beginning at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday until Sunday at 7:00 p.m. 
unless the holiday extends for a lengthier period of time to which the 
noncustodial parent is completely entitled; 
g. Columbus Day beginning at 6:00 p.m. the day before the 
holiday until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
h. Thanksgiving holiday beginning Wednesday at 7:00 p.m. until 
Sunday at 7:00 p.m.; and 
i. The second portion of the Christmas school vacation (as that 
term is defined above), plus Christmas Day beginning at 1:00 p.m. until 9:00 
p.m., so long as the entire Christmas holiday is equally divided; 
iriL Father's Day shall be spent with the Respondent father every year 
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
viii. Mother's Day shall be spent with the Petitioner mother every year 
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the holiday; 
ix. Father's birthday shall be spent with the Respondent father every year 
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the birthday; at the discretion of the father, 
he may take other siblings along for the birthday; n 
x. Mother's birthday shall be spent with the Petitioner mother every year 
beginning at 9:00 a.m. until 7:00 p.m. on the birthday; at the discretion of the mother, 
she may take other siblings along for the birthday; 
xi. Extended visitation with the noncustodial parent may be: 
a. Up to four weeks consecutive at the option of the noncustodial 
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parent; 
b. Two weeks shall be uninterrupted time for the noncustodial 
parent; 
C. and the remaining two weeks shall be subject to visitation for 
the custodial parent consistent with these guidelines; 
xii. The custodial parent shall have an identical two week period of 
uninterrupted time during the children's summer vacation from school for the 
purposes of vacation; 
xiii. If the child is enrolled in year-round school, the noncustodial parent's 
extended visitation shall be one-half of the vacation time for year-round school 
breaks, provided the custodial parent has holiday and phone visits; 
xiv. Notification of extended visitation or vacation weeks with the child 
shall be provided at least 30 days in advance to the other parent; and 
xv. Telephone contact shall be at reasonable hours. 
C» A neutral site for pick-up and drop-off of the children should be established, 
if necessary. If the children transition from parent to school, pick-up and drop-off between 
parents will be reduced. However, during those times when school is not in session, an 
additional neutral site should be selected with pick-up and drop-off times to be the same as 
when the children are in school. 
;l L Given the young ages of the children, there are a number of strategies 
that can be used to help them maintain a sense of constancy and to help maintain the 
relationship with their father as follows: 
a. Freedom with telephone contact, letters, cards, etc., between 
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visits. 
b. Use of transitional objects from both environments. Such 
things as photographs, music, stories, comforters, should be allowed to be 
<r , v passed back and forth freely between the homes. 
c. Maintenance of custodial home routines e.g., bedtimes, 
mealtimes, etc. 
d. Helping the children plan for visitation by holding concretely 
to the visitation order and by describing these plans in understandable ways. 
e. The custodial parent should provide written instructions with 
each visit transition of important information regarding care of the children. 
The non-custodial parent should make himself familiar with the children's 
lives to the extent he is informed of important events. 
f. Both parties shall refrain from making disparaging remarks 
towards the other party and limit moments of conflict to occur when the 
children are not observers. The parties must recognize the children's best 
interests will be served through mutual cooperation and support, despite 
personal differences. 
4. The parties are in agreement that Patrick C. Barker, Ph.D., 260 Maple Court, Suite 
129, Ventura, California, 93003-3512, telephone number 805-654-1018, fax number 805-654-1098, 
shall be appointed as the Special Master between the parties. In the event that Dr. Barker is unable, 
or unwilling, to act as the Special Master between the parties, then Dr. James B. Cole, Ph.D., 993 
West Seventh Street, Oxnard, California, 93030, telephone number 805-483-9565, fax number 805-
486-5483, shall be appointed as the Special Master between the parties. 
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5. The Special Master may make orders resolving conflicts between the Petitioner and 
the Respondent which do not affect the court's exclusive jurisdiction to determine fundamental 
issues of custody and visitation. Each party specifically agrees that the Special Master may make 
decisions regarding possible conflict they may have. The Special Master shall have the authority 1) 
to enforce the terms of this agreement, 2) to expand the Respondent's rights of visitation, and 3) to 
resolve disputes between the parties regarding the following issues: 
A. The decision making on behalf of the parties' minor children that would 
normally be made by the parties and articulated in a parenting plan. 
^
 r B. The joint decision making between the parties and when and if it should be 
commenced and a parenting plan to implement it. (See 3-A of this agreement) 
C. The issue of whether or not the Petitioner shall provide the Petitioner's street 
address to the Respondent is reserved for determination by the Special 
Master. 
D. The issue of the religious upbringing of the children is reserved for 
determination by the Special Master including: 
i. baptism and religious training 
ii. church attendance 
iii. priesthood ordinations 
E. How to arrange the transportation between the parties for visitation including 
how to allocate the costs of transportation and the responsibility for 
participating in the transportation. 
F. Where the pick-up and drop-off of the children shall take place. 
G. The grandparent's and extended family's involvement with the exchange and 
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visitation. 
H. . Regarding the consideration of section 3-A-v of this agreement, if the 
custodial parent wants to, or should be entitled to, move from her present 
, ^ location and how that would impact custody, visitation and transportation 
< ; / ; ; , ; C O S t S . • ,:' - - ' " ' 
I. The issue of if the non-custodial parent wants to move from his present 
location and how that would impact custody, visitation and transportation 
costs. 
J. The issue of implementing notification of the non-custodial parent of any 
lapse of insurance coverage for the minor children, as agreed to here in as 
section 20-B, shall be addressed by the Special Master if there is a dispute 
between the parties. 
K. The issue of medical treatment, decisions, and all information and records 
concerning the children shall be addressed by the Special Master if there is 
a dispute between the parties. 
L. The issue of school records and participation, as well as all other materials 
relating to the children, shall be addressed by the Special Master if there is a 
dispute between the parties. 
M. The issue of the non-custodial parent's visitation rights during additional 
school break periods if there is a dispute between the parties. 
N. The issue of whether or not Respondent's rights of summer visitation should 
be expanded from the Utah Statutory Visitation of four (4) consecutive weeks 
for children attending traditional school, or 50% of any off track periods for 
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children in year round school, is reserved for determination by the Special 
Master. 
O. The issue of resolving, in accordance with this agreement, visitation 
scheduling conflicts that may arise between the parties shall be addressed by 
the Special Master if there is a dispute between the parties. 
P, The issue of resolving hinderance of visitation, and/or communication via 
phone, mail, and/or email shall be addressed by the Special Master if there is 
a dispute between the parties. 
Q. The issue of whether or not the Respondent is current on his child support 
obligation to allow the Respondent to claim the minor children as 
dependents, as set forth in this agreement, shall be addressed by the Special 
Master if there is a dispute between the parties. 
R. The issue of tax neutrality, as set forth in this agreement, for tax years 1996 
& 1997, as established in this agreement, shall be addressed by the Special 
Master if there is a dispute between the parties. 
S. The issue of payment of capital gains obligations, as set forth in this 
agreement, as well as any unforeseen areas of conflict regarding tax liabilities 
that may arise between the parties, shall be addressed by the Special Master 
if there is a dispute between the parties. 
T. The issue of dividing the retirement, pension or profit sharing plan shall be 
addressed by the Special Master. 
U. The issue of alternating the pre-Christmas break weekend visitation to allow 
the parent with the second half of the Christmas break to spend the weekend 
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prior to the Christmas break with the children shall be addressed by the 
Special Master if there is a dispute between the parties. 
V.
 n In the event that unforeseen areas of conflict arise, whether from unintended 
contradiction within this agreement, or otherwise, the issue of resolving the 
conflict, in compliance with the terms of this agreement, is reserved for 
determination by the Special Master. In making any such determination, the 
following precedence shall govern: this decree, highest precedence, Dr. 
Jensen's custody evaluation and addendum, second, and governing statute, 
: third. If an area of dispute is not covered within those three areas, then the 
issue is reserved for determination by the Special Master. 
6. The Special Master shall not make any orders which alter an award of physical 
custody, alter an award of legal custody, or substantially interfere with a party's contact with his/her 
children. In an emergency, the Special Master may ask the court to initiate an Order to Show Cause 
on its own motion. , 
7. The Respondent's rights of summer visitation for 1998 shall be exercised from June 
29th for a period of four (4) consecutive weeks. The Respondent will be entitled to his weekends, 
at the beginning and/or end of his four (4) consecutive weeks, and that the visitation would conclude 
on July 27th at 9:00 a.m. 
8. The Petitioner shall promptly provide to the Respondent the following: 
A. a Post Office Box for mailing information to the children, 
B. a home telephone number for contacting the children so that the Respondent 
can have unlimited access to the children. r 
C. an E-mail address if, and when, it becomes available in the future. 
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9. It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall pay child support to the 
Petitioner in the amount of $1,300.00 per month for July, August and September of 1998. 
Commencing in October of 1998 and onward it is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall 
pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount of $1,075.00 per month with one-half due on or 
before the 5th and one-half due on or before the 20th of each month. 
10. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.10, when the oldest of the children 
becomes 18 years of age or is graduated from High School during the child's normal and expected 
year of graduation, whichever occurs later, the base child support award is automatically reduced to 
reflect the lower base combined child support obligation shown in the Utah Child Support Table for 
the remaining number of children due child support. 
11. Pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-45-7.11, the Respondent shall be entitled to 
a fifty percent 50% abatement in child support when the Respondent has the children with him for 
twenty-five (25) out of thirty (30) consecutive days. Normal visitation and holiday visits to the 
custodial parent during said period of time shall not be considered an interruption of the consecutive 
day requirement. 
12. If the custodial parent desires to relocate more than just a few blocks, sixty (60) days 
notice of the intent to move shall be given, which would be communicated through the Special 
Master if the parties are unable to communicate directly. If a dispute over the move arises, said 
dispute shall be addressed by the Special Master. 
13. It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent shall pay alimony to the Petitioner for 
July, August and September of 1998 in the amount of $200.00 per month. The Respondent's 
alimony obligation to the Petitioner shall forever terminate from October of 1998 onward. 
14. It is reasonable and proper that each party be responsible for one-half of the 
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reasonable and necessary work related child care costs incurred on behalf of the parties minor 
children, commencing September of 1998 and onward. The Respondent shall have no child care 
obligation prior to that time. Said child support obligation commencing in September of 1998, shall 
be subject to the incurring party providing written verification of the cost and identity of the child 
care provider to the other parent upon initial engagement of the provider and thereafter upon the 
request of the other parent. Said parent shall notify the other parent of any change of child care 
provider or the monthly expense of child care within thirty (30) days from the date of the change. 
A. In addition to any other sanctions provided by the court (including the Special 
Master), the parent incurring child care expenses may be denied the right to receive credit 
for the expenses or to recover the other parent's share of the expenses if the parent incurring 
expenses fails to comply with the provisions set forth above. 
15. During the course of the marriage, prior to the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the 
parties acquired personal property, which personal property shall be awarded as presently divided 
except that there are photos to which the Respondent is entitled. The Respondent shall be entitled 
to review the photos and obtain any duplicates that he desires with the Respondent bearing those 
costs. If there is a dispute between the parties in implementing this arrangement then it shall be 
resolved by working through the Special Master. j 
16. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired real property, which real 
property was sold. The Respondent has likewise purchased property in Midway, Utah, that is 
awarded solely to the Respondent free and clear of any claim of the Petitioner and the Petitioner 
acknowledges that she has no interest therein. 
17. As it relates to the sale of the real property that was acquired during the course of the 
parties' marriage, each party shall be responsible for 100% of the capital gains on their own equally 
16 
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divided profits of $31,500.00 that each party received and shall hold the other party harmless there 
from. 
18. During the course of the marriage the parties acquired debts and obligations, which 
debts and obligations shall be divided as follows: 
A. To the Petitioner: 
i Petitioner's student loans after separation in September of 1995; 
B« To the Respondent: 
h The cost for the storage unit of $2,250, 
H. Marital debt obligations of: 
a. Credit card debt totalling $11,310, 
b. Respondent' s remaining student loans of $ 10,760; 
C The remaining jointly incurred debts of the marriage prior to separation, if 
there are any outstanding, shall be divided equally and the parties shall otherwise hold each 
other harmless there from. 
D. Each party shall be responsible for their own debts and obligations incurred 
subsequent to the parties' separation, which separation occurred in September of 1995. 
E. The costs of the custody evaluation shall be permanently divided as 
temporarily divided by the court and paid by the parties. 
F. Each party shall hold the other party harmless from the debts that they have 
assumed as set forth above. 
19. It is reasonable and proper that the parties divide the dependency exemptions for the 
children as follows: 
A. For the tax years 1996 and 1997, each of the parties claimed the parties' three 
17 
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(3) minor children as dependencies. To resolve this dispute, the Respondent will be entitled 
to claim all three (3) children as dependencies but must hold the Petitioner tax neutral. That 
is to say that the Respondent will be entitled to claim the three (3) minor children as 
dependencies or any number of said children but only by putting the Petitioner in the same 
position she would have been in had she claimed said children as dependencies. This will 
be accomplished by the Petitioner sharing with the Respondent, within fifteen (15) days of 
June 26, 1996, her tax information with claiming three (3) children and without claiming any 
of the children. If the parties are unable to resolve their differences as it relates to the 
dependency exemptions, then that issue shall be addressed by the Special Master or, if the 
Special Master is unable to resolve the dispute, then by the court by way of an Order to Show 
Cause. 
B. Commencing with the tax year 1998 and onward, the Respondent shall be 
entitled to claim the parties' children, Joshua and Jacob, as dependencies for income tax 
purposes on condition that the Respondent is current in his child support, child care, medical 
and dental costs. The Petitioner will be entitled to claim the parties' minor child, Brooke, 
as a dependency for income tax purposes, commencing with the tax year 1998 and onward. 
Presuming that the Respondent satisfies the obligation to be current in support then the 
Petitioner will sign the IRS 8332 Form by January 15th and provide it to Respondent directly. 
If the parties are unable to resolve their differences as it relates to support obligations, then 
that issue shall be addressed by the Special Master or, if the Special Master is unable to 
resolve the dispute, then by the court by way of an Order to Show Cause. 
20. As it relates to health, dental, and accident insurance it shall be arranged as follows: 
A. It is reasonable and proper that the Respondent maintain health, dental, 
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accident, eye care and orthodontia coverage that the Respondent is presently maintaining, if 
any, through July of 1998 under the Cobra plan. 
B. The Petitioner shall maintain health, dental, accident, eye care and 
orthodontia coverage on behalf of the children from September 1, 1998 and onward. The 
Petitioner states that the Petitioner will have no difficulty nor limited coverage because of 
pre-existing conditions. 
C. The Respondent may maintain additional health, dental, accident, eye care 
and orthodontia coverage on behalf of the minor children, as secondary insurance, if it is of 
benefit to the children and is economically feasible taking into consideration the monthly 
premium, with the Petitioner being responsible for one-half of the children's portion of the 
monthly premium. Irrespective of whether or not the Respondent maintains said secondary 
insurance coverage, the Respondent shall be responsible for no more than one-half of the 
remaining reasonable and necessary health, dental, accident, eye care and orthodontia costs 
incurred on behalf of the minor children, if any, that are not covered by the Petitioner's 
primary insurance including the children's portion of the monthly premium of the Petitioner's 
primary coverage. 
21. The Petitioner alleges that because of treatment on Jacob's eye that there is a bill for 
$3,000.00. Respondent shall be responsible for one-half of the bill of up to $3,000.00 with the 
Respondent's one-half maximum being $1,500.00 subject to the Petitioner providing prompt 
documentation. 
22. If medical, dental, orthodontia, eye care, or accident treatment on behalf of the 
children is of a non-emergency nature, the Petitioner is directed to wait until the Petitioner's coverage 
on the children commences on September 1, of 1998. 
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23. The Petitioner's Protective Order, which originated as an Ex-Parte Protective Order 
and resulted in a stipulated Protective Order, against the Respondent in the Fourth District Court of 
Wasatch County, State of Utah, Case No. 954400090, is hereby dismissed. 
24. Both parties are mutually restrained and enjoined from harassing, annoying, 
threatening or harming the other or from making disparaging comments about the other parent in the 
presence of the children. 
25. It is reasonable and proper that each party be awarded one-half of any pension, profit 
sharing plan, or retirement that the other party accrued during the course of the marriage up until 
entry of the Decree of Divorce. Both parties shall cooperate and share the information with each 
other. If there is a way of dividing the retirement, pension or profit sharing plan without preparing 
Qualified Domestic Relations Order(s) then the parties are encouraged to do so. Otherwise, the 
Petitioner shall have the appropriate Qualified Domestic Relations Order(s) prepared in a timely 
fashion. 
26. The Respondent shall be entitled to pay child support to the Petitioner by sending the 
payments directly to the Petitioner's Post Office Box. In the event that the Respondent falls in 
arrears in his ongoing child support in the future by more than thirty (30) days, then the Petitioner 
will be entitled to mandatory income withholding relief pursuant to Utah Code Annotated Section 
62a-11-401 (1953) as amended. 
27. The initial retainer required by the Special Master shall be deposited by the 
Respondent. However, any costs incurred for the Special Master shall be divided between the parties 
with the Petitioner bearing 32.5% and the Respondent bearing 67.5% of the total cost. At the 
conclusion, the initial deposit or retainer will be reimbursed in its entirety to the Respondent. 
28. The Respondent shall be responsible for his own attorney's fees of $10,968.47 
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incurred in pursuing the divorce action and shall further be responsible for 33% of the Petitioner's 
attorney's fees in the amount of $3,547.00. 
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APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
WENDY HUFNAGEL 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DATED this is Aljdzx of Ne§^&«fl99' 
JUDGEltAY k . HARDING 
STRICT COURT JUDG 
4-504 MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the following, 
postage prepaid, this ((— day of Novemberr 1998. 
Wendy Hufnagel 
190 N Main St Ste 200 
Heber City UT 84032 
DANA D. BURROWS 
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APPENDIX "B" 
Order on Order to Show Cause and Judgment, entered Aug. 12, 1999 
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DANAD. BURROWS - 5045 
Attorney for Respondent 
1149 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
FILED 0 ' & t ( 
Fourth Judicial District Court of 
Wasatch County, State of Utah 
C A R M A - ^ . SMITH, Clerk 
&jf • Deputy 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON, 
BARTON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER ON ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
AND JUDGEMENT 
Civil No. 954400090 
Judge Lynn Davis 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court for Order to Show Cause in Re 
Contempt on Wednesday, August 11,1999, before the Honorable Judge Lynn Davis. The Petitioner 
was not present nor was the Petitioner represented by counsel. The Respondent was present and 
represented by counsel, Dana D. Burrows. The court having reviewed the matter and being fully 
advised in the premises, now, therefore, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
1. Petitioner was personally and properly served with the Motion, Affidavit and Order to Show 
Cause and filed an Affidavit in Response to Respondent's Order to Show Cause Re Contempt 
but failed to personally appear or through counsel. 
2. The court finds that the Petitioner had an obligation to appear in court in person regardless 
of whether the Petitioner felt that the Fourth District Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah 
has jurisdiction over the action or not since the Decree of Divorce and the Addendum to 
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Decree were entered in the Fourth District Court of Wasatch County, State of Utah and there 
has been no Order transferring jurisdiction from Utah to the State of California. 
The Court finds Petitioner in contempt of court for failing to appear at the Order to Show 
Cause hearing and especially for failure to comply with the Addendum to Decree of Divorce 
entered by the court on December 22, 1998, regarding the Special Master and other 
provisions. 
The Respondent incurred costs for service and notarization in the amount of $38.00, as well 
as for an airline ticket for travel in the amount of $259.00, and lost wages at a rate of $300.00 
per day for 1V2 days of employment for a total of $450.00 as well as attorney's fees in the 
amount of $650.00 necessitated by this Order to Show Cause and Petitioner's failure to 
comply with the Addendum to Decree of Divorce. Respondent is awarded judgment against 
the Petitioner for the amount set forth above for a total judgment in the amount of $1,397.00 
and the Petitioner is ordered to immediately reimburse the Respondent for said amount. 
The Respondent is entitled to makeup visitation for the lost visitation on the weekend of 
Thursday, August 5th, through Monday, August 9, 1999. Said makeup visitation shall 
commence on Thursday, August 12, 1999 at 2:30 p.m. and continue until Monday, August 
16, 1999 at 8:30 a.m. 
The Respondent is entitled to extended visitation for a period of four consecutive weeks 
which is to commence at the conclusion of the makeup visitation at 8:30 a.m. on Monday, 
August 16, 1999 and is to run until Monday, September 13, 1999 at 8:30 a.m. when the 
children are to be returned by the Respondent to the Petitioner. 
Any future hearings scheduled in the Fourth District Court of Wasatch County State of Utah 
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shall be heard in Provo, Utah regardless of who requests the hearing, if in fact the Respondent 
so desires said hearing to occur in Provo, Utah. 
The Petitioner shall immediately contact the Special Master, Dr. Cole, and shall immediately 
schedule an appointment and make arrangements to meet with Dr. Cole and to address the 
issues raised by the Respondent and set forth in the Addendum to Decree of Divorce entered 
by the court on December 22, 1998 and attempt to resolve said issues promptly and in good 
faith. 
Petitioner shall immediately reimburse the Respondent for the judgement amount as set forth 
in paragraph 3 above and shall further cooperate with the Respondent's makeup and extended 
visitation as outlined in paragraph 5 above and cooperate by contacting and cooperating with 
the Special Master as set forth in paragraph 7 above, all of which are part of the Finding of 
Contempt. The court will reserve implementation of penalty or incarceration pending a 
review hearing to determine the Petitioner's compliance with the terms and conditions of this 
order which review hearing shall occur 60 days or more from August 11, 1999 to enable the 
Petitioner suflBcient time to comply with the court order regarding payment of the judgement 
as well as Make Up and Extended Visitation and cooperation with the Special Master. The 
review hearing will not be scheduled but can be noticed up which notice may be served upon 
the Petitioner by mailing to the Petitioner's last known address. 
DATED for this ' ^ day of August, 1999. 
JUl^ELYNNlDAVIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING AND FAX CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregomg was faxed and mailed to the 
following, postage prepaid, this \%$> day of August, 1999. 
Fax: (805)492-1079. Attn: Rhonda Barton (80S) 493-8392 
and 
Rhonda Barton 
2874 Conejo Canyon Rd #21 
Thousand Oaks CA 91362 
DANA D. BURROWS 
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
APPENDIX "C" 
Order for Sanctions, entered Nov. 5, 1999 
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DANAD. BURROWS - 5045 
Attorney for Respondent 
1149 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON, 
BARTON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER FOR SANCTIONS 
Civil No. 954400090 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court for Review Hearing before the 
Honorable Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr., on Monday, October 18, 1999, on what sanctions to impose 
against the Petitioner based upon the finding of contempt entered by the court in the Order on Order 
to Show Cause and Judgment on August 12, 1999. Petitioner was present and represented by 
counsel Don Petersen. Respondent was present and represented by counsel Dana D. Burrows. The 
court having heard testimony of both parties as witnesses and being fully advised in the premises, 
now, therefore, the court hereby enters its Findings and Order: 
1. The court finds that the Petitioner has continued in her ongoing willful and intentional 
disregard of the order of the court of August 12, 1999 especially as it relates to the issue of 
ongoing and makeup visitation. " 
2. The Petitioner shall be sentenced to two (2) days in jail at the Utah County Jail with said 
sentence to commence immediately. 
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3. The issue of additional makeup visitation besides that already ordered by the court in the 
Order of August 12, 1999, as well as other sanctions that should be opposed upon the 
Petitioner and other relief that the Respondent may be entitled to as a result of the Petitioner's 
contemptuous behavior are reserved and shall be addressed in the State of California in that 
all remaining issues including custody and visitation have been transferred to the State of 
California. ; 1 
APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
DON R. PETERSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DATED this i day of-OefobSr+m 
)GERAYM. 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGF^S , ^ > $ § f 
^ , C O U R T - ^ ^ 
NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY 
TO: DON R. PETERSEN 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, attorney for Respondent, will submit the 
above and foregoing Order and Judgment to the Fourth District Court for signature, upon the 
expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for mailing, unless written 
objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of Judicial Administration. 
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DATED this 1-1C* day of October, 1999. 
DANA D. BURROWS 
Attorney for Respondent 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this 1x^ day of October, 1999,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order and Judgment, postage prepaid, to the follovsdng: 
Don R. Petersen 
120 E 300 N ' 
PO Box 1248 
Provo UT 84603 
DANA D. BURROWS 
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APPENDIX "D" 
Order Awarding Attorney's Fees and Judgment, entered Nov. 5, 1999 
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DANA D. BURROWS - 5045 
Attorney for Respondent 
1149 West Center 
Orem, Utah 84057 
Telephone: (801) 222-9700 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
OF WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
RHONDA LYNN CAMERON, 
BARTON, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
JOHN KIMBALL BARTON, 
Respondent. 
ORDER AWARDING ATTORNEY'S 
FEES AND JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 954400090 
Judge Ray M. Harding, Jr. 
The above-entitled matter having come before the court to address the issue of the amount 
of attorney's fees that Respondent is awarded and the court having reviewed the Affidavit of counsel 
for the Respondent and having determined that said fees are reasonable and necessary under the 
circumstances, it is hereby ordered as follows: 
1. The Respondent is awarded judgment against the Petitioner for attorney's fees incurred in 
securing visitation with the parties' minor children in the amount of $3,027.38. 
2. The Respondent is awarded judgment against the Petitioner for travel expenses in the amount 
of $154.50 for an airline ticket and lost wages for Wi days in the amount of $450.00. 
3. The total judgment that Respondent is awarded against the Petitioner as a result of attorney's 
fees, travel expenses and lost wages is the amount of $3,631.88. 
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APPROVAL AS TO FORM 
DON R PETERSEN 
Attorney for Petitioner 
DATED this 
)GE RAY M. 
NOTICE TO PETITIONER'S ATTORNEY 
TO: DONR. PETERSEN 
PLEASE TAKE NOTICE that the undersigned, attorney for Respondent, will submit the 
above and foregoing Order Awarding Attorney's Fees and Judgment to the Fourth District Court for 
signature, upon the expiration of five (5) days from the date of this Notice, plus three (3) days for 
mailing, unless written objection is filed prior to that time, pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Rules of 
Judicial Administration. 
DATED this 2 ^ ^ day of October, 1999. I 
iiof £> 
DANA D. BURROWS 
Attorney for Respondent 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this -^- ' - day of October, 1999,1 mailed a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Order Awarding Attorney's Fees and Judgment, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Don R. Petersen 
120E300N 
PO Box 1248 
Provo UT 84603 
DANA D. BURROWS 
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APPENDIX "E" 
Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A 
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28 U.S.C.A. s 1738A 
UNITED STATES CODE ANNOTATED 
TITLE 28. JUDICIARY AND JUDICIAL PROCEDURE 
PART V—PROCEDURE 
CHAPTER 115—EVIDENCE; DOCUMENTARY 
Current through P.L. 106-73, approved 10-19-1999 
§ 1738A. Full faith and credit given to child custody determinations 
(a) The appropriate authorities of every State shall enforce according to its terms, and 
shall not modify except as provided in subsections (f), (g), and (h) of this section, any 
custody determination or visitation determination made consistently with the provisions of 
this section by a court of another State. 
(b) As used in this section, the term— 
(1) "child" means a person under the age of eighteen; 
(2) "contestant" means a person, including a parent or grandparent, who claims a right 
to custody or visitation of a child; 
(3) "custody determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court 
providing for the custody of a child, and includes permanent and temporary orders, and 
initial orders and modifications; 
(4) "home State" means the State in which, immediately preceding the time involved, 
the child lived with his parents, a parent, or a person acting as parent, for at least six 
consecutive months, and in the case of a child less than six months old, the State in which 
the child lived from birth with any of such persons. Periods of temporary absence of any 
of such persons are counted as part of the six-month or other period; 
(5) "modification" and "modify" refer to a custody or visitation determination which 
modifies, replaces, supersedes, or otherwise is made subsequent to, a prior custody or 
visitation determination concerning the same child, whether made by the same court or 
not; 
(6) "person acting as a parent" means a person, other than a parent, who has physical 
custody of a child and who has either been awarded custody by a court or claims a right to 
custody; 
(7) "physical custody" means actual possession and control of a child; 
(8) "State" means a State of the United States, the District of Columbia, the 
Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, or a territory or possession of the United States; and 
(9) "visitation determination" means a judgment, decree, or other order of a court 
providing for the visitation of a child and includes permanent and temporary orders and 
initial orders and modifications. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
(c) A child custody or visitation determination made by a court of a State is consistent 
with the provisions of this section only if— 
(1) such court has jurisdiction under the law of such State; and 
(2) one of the following conditions is met: 
(A) such State (i) is the home State of the child on the date of the 
commencement of the proceeding, or (ii) had been the child's home State within six 
months before the date of the commencement of the proceeding and the child is 
absent from such State because of his removal or retention by a contestant or for 
other reasons, and a contestant continues to live in such State; 
(B) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under 
subparagraph (A), and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child that a court of such State 
assume jurisdiction because (I) the child and his parents, or the child and at least one 
contestant, have a significant connection with such State other than mere physical 
presence in such State, and (II) there is available in such State substantial evidence 
concerning the child's present or future care, protection, training, and personal 
relationships; 
(C) the child is physically present in such State and (i) the child has been 
abandoned, or (ii) it is necessary in an emergency to protect the child because he has been 
subjected to or threatened with mistreatment or abuse; 
(D) (i) it appears that no other State would have jurisdiction under 
subparagraph (A), (B), (C), or (E), or another State has declined to exercise jurisdiction on 
the ground that the State whose jurisdiction is in issue is the more appropriate forum to 
determine the custody or visitation of the child, and (ii) it is in the best interest of the child 
that such court assume jurisdiction; or 
(E) the court has continuing jurisdiction pursuant to subsection (d) of this 
section. 
(d) The jurisdiction of a court of a State which has made a child custody or visitation 
determination consistently with the provisions of this section continues as long as the 
requirement of subsection (c)(1) of this section continues to be met and such State remains 
the residence of the child or of any contestant. 
(e) Before a child custody or visitation determination is made, reasonable notice and 
opportunity to be heard shall be given to the contestants, any parent whose parental rights 
have not been previously terminated and any person who has physical custody of a child. 
(f) A court of a State may modify a determination of the custody of the same child 
made by a court of another State, if~ 
(1) it has jurisdiction to make such a child custody determination; and 
(2) the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction, or it has declined to 
exercise such jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
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(g) A court of a State shall not exercise jurisdiction in any proceeding for a custody or 
visitation determination commenced during the pendency of a proceeding in a court of 
another State where such court of that other State is exercising jurisdiction consistently 
with the provisions of this section to make a custody or visitation determination. 
(h) A court of a State may not modify a visitation determination made by a court of 
another State unless the court of the other State no longer has jurisdiction to modify such 
determination or has declined to exercise jurisdiction to modify such determination. 
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